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ARTICLES
The First Amendment at Its Third
Century: Reckoning with the Ravages
of Time
By DONALD E. LIVELY*
Introduction
Freedom of speech' and freedom of the press2 have been explicit
constitutional commands for precisely two hundred years. Despite its
prominence in the Bill of Rights and status as an essential condition of
ratification,3 the First Amendment did not begin to figure meaningfully
in the nation's jurisprudence until this century. The guarantee's effective
dormancy did not owe to an absence of prior circumstances implicating
constitutional interests. The Alien and Sedition Acts,4 official segrega-
tion,5 and media censorship6 are prominent examples of oppressive and
* Professor, College of Law, University of Toledo; J.D., University of California, Los
Angeles; M.S., Northwestern University; A.B., University of California, Berkeley.
1. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3. The Bill of Rights, enumerating basic individual guarantees that would be protected
from the powers of government, essentially represents an antifederalist legacy. The promise
that itemized rights and liberties would be incorporated into the Constitution induced enough
support to secure ratification. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrUTIONAL LAW 4 n.7 (2d ed.
1988).
4. The Alien and Sedition Acts were the works of President Adams' administration and
a federalist Congress. The laws respectively authorized the President to deport aliens
"judge[d] dangerous to the peace and safety" of the nation, I Stat. 58 (1798), and prohibited
"publishing any false, scandalous and malicious writings... against the government of the
United States, or ... Congress... or the President... with intent to defame [or subject them
to] contempt or disrepute." 1 Stat. 74 (1798).
5. Segregation as a matter of law not only contravenes modern notions of equal protec-
tion but also is at odds with freedom of association, which has become regarded as implicit in
the First Amendment. See, ag., NAACP v. Alabama ex reL Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61
(1958).
6. Censorship of motion pictures, for instance, was not even considered a constitutional
problem insofar as the medium was considered more "spectacle" than press. Mutual Film
Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230, 244 (1915). Not until the middle of this century
[259]
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suppressive action capable of eliciting cognizable first amendment claims
pursuant to standards that eventually evolved. Still, expressive freedom
was at best a subject of passing reference for nearly two-thirds of the
nation's history.7 Not until 1919 and 1931, respectively, did the Court
expound seriously upon freedom of speech8 and account meaningfully for
freedom of the press.9
Modem conventional wisdom holds that the First Amendment's
legacy has been distinguished. As recently as the debate over flag dese-
cration,10 a determinative premise was that the guarantee has served the
country well and tampering with it risked disastrous consequences.1"
The point may have been politically effective in defeating initiatives inim-
ical to imperatives of cultural pluralism. The flattery is essentially mis-
leading, however, insofar as it not only discounts the marginal relevance
of the precept for most of its existence but also glosses over the dark side
of first amendment jurisprudence. The clear and present danger test,12
for instance, was constructed upon the backs of individuals who paid
heavily in terms of personal liberty for their criticism of government.
1 3
was film afforded first amendment status, and even then on a qualified basis leaving it suscepti-
ble to censorship by review boards. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02
(1952).
7. In finding Congress without authority to bar slavery, the Court adverted to the First
Amendment as an example of a general constitutional scheme curtailing federal power. Scott
v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 449-50 (1857). The Court later expounded upon the mean-
ing of the Fourteenth Amendment shortly after its ratification and, without amplification,
identified "[t]he right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances" as a privi-
lege of federal citizenship. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 79 (1873).
8. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (affirming convictions of political
dissidents for violation of Espionage Act).
9. See Near v. Minnesota ex reL Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (freedom of the press safe-
guards against prior restraint).
10. Congress rejected a proposed constitutional amendment that would have enabled
Congress and the states to enact legislation to protect the flag's physical integrity. See Con-
gress: The Flag Boosters Get Burned, NEWSWEEK, July 2, 1990, at 24. The debate followed
the Court's rulings that existing federal and state laws violated the First Amendment. United
States v. Eichman, 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990) (invalidating federal law against flag desecration);
Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989) (invalidating state law against flag desecration).
11. See NEWSWEEK, supra note 10.
12. The standard first enunciated by Justice Holmes merely concerned itself with per-
ceived "bad tendency" of expression. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 629 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting). It eventually evolved so that advocacy of unlawful conduct could not
be prohibited unless speech "is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action." Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per
curiam).
13. Eugene Debs, the Socialist candidate for president in 1920, received nearly one million
votes while imprisoned for antiwar expression. See Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 213-
16 (1919); Kalven, Ernst Freud and the First Amendment Tradition, 40 U. CHi. L. REv. 235,
237 (1973). Debs' conviction has been equated to imprisoning "George McGovern ... for his
criticism of the [Vietnam] War." Id
Multiple categories of expression have been juridically excluded from
constitutional purview. 14 Official restriction or management of protected
speech is permissible under various circumstances,15 and the most domi-
nant modern medium of broadcasting is accorded the least security from
official abridgment. 16 Compounding the narrowing influence of jurispru-
dence has been society's own developmental coursing, which has altered
significantly the context of expressive freedom.
Constitutional inadequacy, if not obsolescence, is evidenced both by
the emergence of expressive territory uncovered by the First Amendment
and by basic terminology that has become susceptible to dispute as mod-
em reality has unfolded. Given the relative ease of speaking and dissemi-
nating expression two centuries ago, the speech and press clauses for
practical purposes were largely redundant. As media industries evolved
and recontoured the dimensions of the press, the case developed for at-
taching independent significance to the clauses. Consistent with such an-
alytical bifurcation, Justice Stewart articulated an institutional definition
of the press that directed special constitutional attention to the industry
whose business it is to communicate. 17 Stewart thus would have ac-
counted for the emergence of mass media that two centuries ago were
nonexistent or underdeveloped. Specifically, the institutional focus
would acknowledge that publishing is no longer a function of individual
predilection but of capitalization costs that make effective communica-
tions prohibitively expensive to all but a few.' I Despite the altered land-
scape that the First Amendment governs, Chief Justice Burger
propounded a competing functional definition that denies "special status
14. Obscenity and fighting words constitute categories of expression entirely beyond the
First Amendment's ambit. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957) (obscenity
exempt from First Amendment's reach because it has no social value); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572-73 (1942) (fighting words are "no essential part of any exposi-
tion of ideas" and thus regulation presents no constitutional problem).
15. Expressive freedom may be curtailed because the speech is devalued, Young v. Ameri-
can Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976) (society has a lesser interest in protecting "offen-
sive" expression), because the medium has diminished constitutional status, FCC v. Pacifica
Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (broadcasting is the least protected of all media), or pursuant
to reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions, Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (state may enforce such regulations to the extent they are content
neutral, narrowly tailored to serve significant governmental interest, and leave open ample
alternative channels of communication).
16. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 748.
17. Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HAST. L.L 631, 633-34 (1975).
18. "Adequate capitalization... is the primary factor excluding the vast majority of the
citizenry from even considering publishing, broadcasting or cablecasting." Lively, Deregu-
latory Illusions and Broadcasting: The First Amendment's Enduring Forked Tongue, 66
ST.C.L. REv. 963, 968 (1988). See Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. FCC,
01 F.2d 501, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert denied, 482 U.S. 919 (1987).
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[for] a limited group"'19 and thereby negates any practical distinction be-
tween speech and the press. Pertinent jurisprudence has yet to factor in
any special role, status or service of the press. Whatever current distinc-
tions might be identified between speech and press owe mostly to realities
that did not exist and were not even foreseeable when the First Amend-
ment was framed. One modem response to the passage of two centuries
is that "modem technological developments in the field of communica-
tions have made the soapbox orator and the leafleteer virtually obso-
lete.""0 The perception reflects the consequent concern that freedom of
speech has been reduced largely to an "abstract,"21 and effective commu-
nication is determined not merely by constitutional guarantee but by ac-
cess to resources for media ownership.
What initially was considered a singular threat to expressive free-
dom posed by centralized authority is now compounded by subsequent
perils of state regulation and, according to some observers, even more
recent concentrations of private power.22 Jurisprudence responded to
the possibility of state abridgment of speech and the press by incorporat-
ing the First Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment.23 Thus far,
it has refused to invest in state action doctrine that might make modem
mass media more accountable to allegedly endangered speech interests.24
Although the Court has been willing to countenance particularized regu-
lation that would subject newer media to standards of fairness,25 it has
been hostile to methodologies that would afford the citizenry actual ac-
cess for self-expression.26 The Court also has encouraged reexamination
19. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 801-02 (1978). See Lange, The Speech and
Press Clauses, 23 UCLA L. REv. 77, 99 (1975).
20. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 196
(1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
21. Id. at 102.
22. The Court has adverted to "vast changes... plac[ing] in a few hands the power to
inform the American people and shape public opinion" and denying "the public... any ability
to respond or to contribute in a meaningful way to the debate on issues." Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 250 (1974).
23. Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931); Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
24. A state action theory, premised upon the federal government's licensing and detailed
regulation of broadcasters, failed to win the Court's support in Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. at 119 (plurality opinion) (regulatory scheme does
not create symbiotic relationship or other basis rising to level of state action).
25. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding fairness doctrine
obligating broadcasters to devote time to controversial issues of public importance and to af-
ford balanced coverage of such matters).
26. The Court denied a general public right of access in Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. at 110-11. The Court, however, has upheld a lim-
ited statutory right of reasonable access for political candidates. Columbia Broadcasting Sys-
of previously endorsed criteria requiring content balance and editorial
accountability.
2 7
Given a basic guarantee that has existed for two centuries, has estab-
lished an actual track record covering approximately one-third of that
time, and has been subject to profound forces and realities beyond the
ken of original contemplation, it is legitimate and timely to reflect upon
whether freedom of speech and freedom of the press for practical pur-
poses have become functionally anachronistic. Contrary to the sense that
the First Amendment should be untouchable, deficiencies in its coverage
and abiding debate over its inspiring values merit critical reappraisal.
Glorifying the First Amendment to the point that its nature and function
are tamper proof is incongruous with its underlying message of free in-
quiry and consequent but assumed risk. This Article will: (1) depict the
First Amendment's true identity under modem circumstances and ex-
amine the reasons for its contemporary bearing, (2) consider how values
that inspire first amendment jurisprudence tend to be underdeveloped,
unrealistic and even inverted, and (3) suggest how the First Amendment
might be recontoured to account more effectively for expressive freedom
as the guarantee enters its third century.
I. The Real First Amendment
A. The First Amendment Guarantee
The First Amendment, like other constitutional rights and liberties,
has evolved as a relative rather than absolute guarantee.28 Its defeasible
nature is manifested not only in jurisprudence, which candidly endorses
content and media regulation in diverse circumstances, but in limiting
principles that convert even purported absolutism into a bounded rather
than unchecked notion. Justice Black, perhaps the foremost exponent of
unequivocal first amendment liberty, ultimately if not admittedly demon-
tern, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 381 (1981) (affirming application of such access as codified by
47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1988)).
27. In FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984), the Court noted that it was
prepared to abandon the fairness doctrine if the scarcity premise was demonstrated to be obso-
lete and the regulation undermined rather than advanced first amendment interests. Id. at
376-79 nn.11-12. A few years later, the Federal Communications Commission terminated the
fairness doctrine on grounds that it was inconsonant with freedom of the press and disserved
first amendment interests. Syracuse Peace Council v. Television Station WTVH Syracuse, 2
F.C.C. Red. 5043, 5055-57 (1987), aff'd, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989). In recently upholding
minority preferences in the licensing process, however, the Court noted that it has "long recog-
nized" that spectrum scarcity justifies special restraints on broadcasters. Metro Broadcasting,
Inc. v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997, 3010 (1990).
28. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49-51 (1961) (rejecting absolutist concept of
First Amendment).
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strated that lines must be drawn with respect to the guarantee's actual
meaning.29 Black's distinction between speech and conduct and the ex-
clusion of symbolic expression may have charted different constitutional
perimeters than the Court etched, but the analysis was no less qualifying
of freedom in both function and effect.
Denominating a right or liberty as conditional permits analytical
reference points to be introduced that otherwise would be precluded if
the guarantee were absolute. The practical meaning of such a qualified
freedom is defined not by what the Constitution commands but by what
is found tolerable despite the Constitution. At least to the extent not
allowed to speak for itself, the First Amendment, like other sweeping
constitutional terms,"0 is dependent upon external values for inspiration
and actuation. The law of the First Amendment thus has become a func-
tion of jurisprudentially selected ideals which have engendered a classifi-
cation process and ranking system for speech and press. If edited to
account for such engineering, the First Amendment would have a more
detailed and equivocal cast than appears documentarily. In pertinent
part, the First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law
... abridging freedom of speech, or of the press."31 As qualified by accu-
mulated expoundment and gloss, the guarantee would read as follows:
No branch of government, federal, state or local, shall legislate or
act in a way that abridges freedom of speech or of the press except:
(1) when expression categorically excluded from the First Amend-
ment is implicated;32 (2) when expression presents a direct, immi-
nent and probable danger of inciting unlawful conduct;33 (3) to
protect reputational interests, provided claims by public officials
and public figures are subject at least to an actual malice stan-
dard;34 (4) to safeguard privacy interests under a variety of circum-
29. Black would have regarded "(s)tanding, patrolling or marching" even to make a polit-
ical point beyond the purview of speech. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 581 (1965). He also
regarded the message "Fuck the Draft," inscribed on the back of a jacket to make a political
statement, as unprotected conduct. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 27 (1971) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
30. The Bill of Rights is replete with terminology that is open-ended and dependent upon
values as a source of inspiration. E.g., U.S. CONsT. amend. IV ("unreasonable searches"); U.S.
CONST. amend. VI ("speedy trial," "impartial jury" and "Assistance of Counsel for his De-
fence"); U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII ("Excessive bail" and "cruel and unusual punishment").
31. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
32. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (obscenity not protected by First
Amendment); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (fighting words not
protected by First Amendment).
33. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
34. See Curtiss Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (plurality opinion) (defama-
tion action by public figure requires showing of actual malice), as recognized by Gertz v. Rob-
ert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345-46 (1974); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
279-80 (1964) (defamation action by public official requires showing of actual malice).
stances;3" and (5) to effectuate legitimate and substantial
governmental interests pursuant to narrowly drawn regulation of
commercial expression. 6 Nothing in this guarantee should be
construed as exempting otherwise protected expression from rea-
sonable time, place and manner restriction." Protection also may
be dependent upon or vary according to the context of expression,
especially insofar as either the government's special interest in pro-
tecting children is implicated' or the unique characteristics of a
particular medium require special attention."
B. Classification and Valuation of Expression
Freedom of expression may be esteemed as a means of facilitating
the general liberty experience, but much dispute over practical terms and
operation exists. Because the actual meaning of speech and press free-
dom is a function of values rather than charter ordination, first amend-
ment theorizing is a highly competitive exercise. Given ideals that are
debatable and classifications that are often imprecise, actuation of princi-
ple may feed rather than resolve controversy. Notwithstanding the real-
ity that some Framers helped fashion draconian schemes hostile to
political dissent,' the Court has ascribed the highest value and afforded
utmost constitutional attention to "speech relating to informed self-gov-
ernment."4 1 By so doing the Court has invested in theory-identified
most closely with Alexander Meiklejohn-that emphasizes the signifi-
cance of expression relating to the democratic process.42 Even with re-
spect to expression afforded the highest constitutional status, valuation is
a function of perceived significance for the society rather than for the
35. Privacy actions may be grounded in a right of publicity, unreasonable intrusion into a
person's privacy, unreasonable publicity of an individual's private life, and false-light privacy.
See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (right of publicity);
Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971) (unreasonable intrusion); Florida Star
v. B.LF., 109 S. Ct. 2603 (1989) (unreasonable publicity); Time Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374
(1967) (false-light privacy).
36. See Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328, 344 (1986).
37. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
38. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (First Amendment's significance di-
minished to the extent children may be adversely affected by otherwise protected expression).
39. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969) (unique characteris-
tics of each medium require customized regulation).
40. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
41. A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 18-
19, 22-27 (1948).
42. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561-63
(1980); id. at 579-83 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 595-99 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (empha-
sizing primacy of political expression).
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individual.43 Rival notions contest both the premise and perspective. In-
stead of a focus upon collective worth, speech alternatively would be val-
ued according to its capacity to advance personal knowledge, engender
self-development, and facilitate self-realization." Although operative
theory has evolved to account for expression not strictly related to the
political process,4" a reference point of societal rather than personal util-
ity has significant consequences for the First Amendment's reach. De-
spite rhetoric emphasizing the virtues of autonomous selection,46 the
perspective for practical purposes may favor, or at least be hospitable to,
a system of authoritative selection defining what speech is fit for public
consumption.
1. Speech Classification and Consequences
Classifying expression as an extension of selected values creates nu-
merous problems and anomalies. Categorization has translated not only
into diminished protection in some instances but also into exclusion of
certain speech forms altogether from the First Amendment's protective
ambit. Obscenity, for example, has been devalued and constitutionally
dismissed on the grounds that it entirely lacks social value.4 7 In explain-
ing obscenity's unprotected status, the Court observed that "modem so-
cieties do not leave disposal of garbage and sewage to 'free will.' "48
Appraisal couched in terms of a societal interest and perspective
might yield different results if pitched instead toward personal utility.
When obscenity is examined on a basis of worth to the individual rather
than according to general tendencies or values, constitutional respect
may be warranted to the extent it may afford pleasure, help establish
sexual identity, or promote the exercise of personal autonomy.49 No cat-
43. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, PoLITIcAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF THE
PEOPLE 73-75 (1960) (freedom of expression facilitates informed decision-making necessary
for democratic viability).
44. See M. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 11-12 (1984); T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM
OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6-7 (1970).
45. Meiklejohn himself eventually acknowledged that constitutional protection must be
afforded literature, art, science, and philosophy. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Ab-
solute, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 245, 257.
46. The First Amendment has been depicted as "presuppos[ing] that right conclusions are
more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authorita-
tive selection." United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff'd,
326 U.S. 1 (1945).
47. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957) (obscenity entirely lacking in re-
deeming social value).
48. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 64 (1973).
49. See Roth, 354 U.S. at 509 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (devaluation of obscenity presumes
that "arousing of sexual thoughts and desires [which] happens every day in normal life in
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egory of expression is more susceptible to jurisprudential disparagement
than obscenity.50 The combination of an intractable definitional prob-
lem51 and questionable valuation premises creates a treacherous analyti-
cal potential that compounds as more universally valued expression
becomes implicated.
Value-driven constitutional line-drawing and imprecision of resul-
tant classifications present risks even to the most esteemed variants of
expression. Charting a line between political speech and supposedly less
worthy expression may be neat in theory but is perilous in practice.
Commercial speech has been defined as expression proposing an eco-
nomic transaction52 or relating to economic self-interest.53 Neither de-
piction is exact enough, however, to avoid ensnaring political expression
and similarly diminishing its status. Political fund-raising and advocacy
inspired by economic considerations, for instance, have significant com-
mercial dimensions. Chief Justice Rehnquist actually would characterize
solicitation of money for a political action group as commercial speech.54
The ramification of such a one-dimensional focus is diminished constitu-
tional status in the hierarchy of protected expression.
The risk of classifying speech in singular terms, when expression
may have multidimensional characteristics, is also evident in jurispru-
dence that identifies and devalues indecent expression. Political speech,
at least when clearly discernible, is jurisprudentially revered to the point
that vilification and even falsehood may be countenanced in deference to
"the profound national commitment to the principle that debate on pub-
dozens of ways" is worthless); Lockhart & McClure, Literature, the Face of Obscenity and the
Constitution, 38 MINN. L. REV. 295, 380 (1954) (stimulation of sexual thoughts not inherently
wrong and may elevate sexual consciousness in positive fashion); Levine & Curry, Whip Me,
Beat Me, and While You're at it Cancel My NO. W Membership, THE WASHINGTON
MONTHLY, June 1987, at 17-19 (anti-obscenity efforts would impose one-dimensional stan-
dards upon diverse citizenry).
50. Fighting words also are excluded from the First Amendment's ambit but, insofar as
regulation is defeasible as vague or overbroad, have proved a less prolific source of suppression.
See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972) (reversing, on vagueness and overbreadth
grounds, conviction based upon use of abusive or opprobrious language).
51. The treacheries of objectifying obscenity led to Justice Stewart's characterization of
the classification process as "trying to define what may be undefinable" and confession that "I
know it when I see it." Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
For like reasons, Justice Brennan would have prohibited obscenity controls except to the ex-
tent children and unconsenting adults are implicated. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413
U.S. at 112-13 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
52. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
761-62 (1976).
53. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980).
54. Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 641-42 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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lic issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide open." 5 Political or
social commentary that may be officially perceived as distastefully ex-
pressed, however, may be subject to devaluation.56 Speech, even if pro-
tected, is subject to nuisance analogies if perceived as " 'a right thing in
the wrong place-like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard.' ))7
With respect to sexually explicit but not obscene expression, the Court
has observed that "few of us would march our sons and daughters off to
war to preserve the citizen's right to see 'Specified Sexual Activities' ex-
hibited in the theatres of our choice." 8 Neither the appraisal nor the
prediction accounts, however, for the consequences when allegedly inde-
cent expression is mixed with more esteemed speech and suppression en-
sues.59 Nor does analysis reveal awareness of, much less distress with, a
procrustean labeling system. To the extent speech interests of societal
subgroups may be slighted,' ° and micromanagement of speech detracts
from the dynamics of free expression, the classification process is at odds
with rudimentary imperatives of cultural pluralism and personal
autonomy.
The selection of values that inspire first amendment principles also
influences whether purportedly content neutral criteria are impartial in
reality. The Court has enunciated the general principle that "above all
else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to re-
strict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its
content., 61 Time, place and manner controls are permissible, however,
provided they are reasonable.62 Determining what is reasonable and thus
permissible requires consideration of whether the regulation is "narrowly
tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, . . . leave(s) open
ample alternative channels of communication" and is unrelated to con-
55. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
56. A satirical monologue lampooning society's attitudes toward common vulgarities thus
was subject to time-channeling because its style of presentation was offensive. See FCC v.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749-50 (1978).
57. Id. at 750 (quoting Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926)).
58. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976).
59. Political and indecent expression merged, for instance, when a draft protester ex-
pressed his sentiments by emblazoning "Fuck the Draft" on the back of his jacket. See Cohen
v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
60. Regulation of expression denominated as indecent disregarded, for instance, how
"[w]ords generally considered obscene like 'bullshit' and Tuck' are considered neither obscene
nor derogatory in [black] vernacular except in particular contextual situations and when used
with certain intonations." FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 776 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(quoting C. BINS, Toward an Ethnography of Contemporary African American Oral Poetry,
Language and Linguistics Working Papers No. 5, at 82 (Georgetown University Press
(1972))).
61. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
62. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
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tent.63 As the classification process has evolved, time, place, and manner
analysis has proceeded pursuant to a sliding scale which the judiciary has
created but does not openly acknowledge. It is difficult to imagine the
Court allowing a zoning ordinance to impose the same restrictions upon
political expression, for instance, that are tolerated upon speech if also
regarded as indecent." Consideration of what constitutes reasonable
regulation may factor out or diminish the significance of neutrality con-
siderations if the worth of expression is perceived to be slight. Official
control that is supposedly not permitted if related to content, therefore,
may operate precisely because of content.65
The consequences of classification might be more tolerable if the
presumption underlying speech differentiation were valid and compel-
ling. The premise that political speech is of paramount importance, how-
ever, is at least controvertible. If actual electoral participation is a
touchstone, political expression has limited rather than comprehensive
societal pertinence.66 Participation in the economic marketplace, by con-
trast, is a much more universal phenomenon. The Court itself has ob-
served that a person's "interest in the free flow of commercial
information... may be as keen, if not keener by far, than [one's] interest
in the day's most urgent political debate."6 7 Assignment of the highest
constitutional ranking to political expression reflects an exercise that de-
limits autonomous selection and development. It also reveals a paternal-
istic bent to pertinent review and inspiring values which are incongruent
with general first amendment imagery.68
The status of political speech as the most revered form of expression
actually may present an argument for close rather than diminished regu-
latory attention. Justice White has observed that false speech, even of a
political nature, presents serious enough dangers to merit stricter con-
63. Id.
64. E.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); Young v. Ameri-
can Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
65. See Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(vacating FCC time-channeling of indecent programming on grounds it was concerned with,
rather than neutral toward, content).
66. In the 1988 presidential election, only half of eligible voters actually cast ballots. 1989
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, No. 433, at 258. The 1986 congressional
election elicited participation by 33.4% of the voting public. Id
67. Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 763
(1976).
68. Conventional first amendment wisdom contemplates and accepts the possibility that
the public will respond unwisely to expression or incur harm as the cost of a system of free
speech. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791-92 (1978).
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trol.6 9 If expression is valued insofar as it facilitates informed decisions
relating to self-government, falsehood may undermine the paramount
aims to the extent it misinforms the public and pollutes the stream of
information.7 0 Augmenting White's position is the premise that mislead-
ing expression breeds cynicism among the citizenry and alienates persons
who otherwise would participate in the political process. Such conten-
tions challenge traditional notions that the First Amendment assumes
the risk of the public being duped, manipulated into unwise decisions, or
apathetic.7 " Assignment of responsibility for "ultimate judgment... [to]
the people [lest they] lose their ability to govern themselves"7 " anticipates
a rational information marketplace. To the extent the forum is dysfunc-
tional, the dependability of autonomous judgment is impaired and the
utility of free market controls is compromised.
2. Media Classification and Consequences
The touchstone of a rational marketplace of ideas is the time and
opportunity to respond.73 Modern political advertising, especially in the
electronic media however, presents some serious impediments to effective
counterspeech. Claims that lack substantiation,74 obscure the agenda be-
ing promoted,75 mislead,76 or perpetuate a harmful stereotype77 have be-
69. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 767 (1985)
(White, J., dissenting) (arguing for abandonment of actual malice standard in defamation
actions).
70. Id.
71. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
72. First Nat'l Bank, 435 U.S at 791 n.31.
73. Justice Brandeis thus observed, "If there be time to expose through discussion the
falsehood ... the remedy to be applied is more speech." Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,
377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
74. Typical of such advertising was the tobacco industry's opposition to a California bal-
lot proposition to increase cigarette taxes on the grounds that passage would result in increased
violent crime. The general theme that the proposal "would create major crime," and specific
question whether it was "worth taking the chance that one more innocent person may be
killed," were unsubstantiated. The premise, that gangs would become involved in cigarette
smuggling if the tax were approved, was advanced pursuant to polling data showing no other
arguments to which the public would respond. One of the advertisement's architects conceded
that no evidence existed of cigarette-related murders. See Hinerfeld, How Political Ads Sub-
tract, THE WASHINGTON MONTHLY, May 1990, at 14.
75. A Los Angeles proposition, competing with a ballot measure that would stop coastal
drilling in a nearby area, was sponsored by the Los Angeles Public and Coastal Protection
Committee. Despite the environmental agenda implied by the sponsor's name, the committee
actually was a front for a major oil company which was interested in drilling on land near the
coast. Id. at 18.
76. During the last presidential election, the Bush campaign ran an advertisement show-
ing the filth of Boston Harbor and attributing responsibility to Democratic candidate Michael
Dukakis. The spot omitted the important points that Dukakis was the first governor to at-
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come common currency in political campaigns. The effectiveness of
negative and deceptive political advertising owes in large part to the na-
ture of mass media. Impressions and implications effectively communi-
cated in seconds may require much more time to explain away or undo. 78
Commercial advertising is subject to the checking influence of consumer
or investor protection regulation and private legal action. Dubious or
erroneous political assertions may circulate without challenge, unless
their victim can command or the media can provide sufficient public at-
tention to clarify, correct, and thereby restore rationality. Several factors
confound effective balancing in modem times. Carefiflly structured
political spots may massage facts in a way that does not constitute out-
right falsification but nonetheless misleads. An assertion that "Candi-
date A voted to let corporate polluters off the hook," for instance, may be
technically accurate in depicting a vote against a particular measure.
However, it may distort an otherwise strong environmental record or the
candidate's support for even stricter legislation. Even a truth deceives if
not presented fully and accurately. Such expressive trade invariably fa-
cilitates perceptions which are distorted, incomplete, and incongruent
with traditional notions of informed decision-making on matters pertain-
ing to self-government.
Accounting for the truth is perplexing insofar as the response to
deception may require more time, prove less galvanizing, and perhaps
even reinforce the misleading assertion. Given such impediments to ef-
fective counterspeech, the press' exercise of its watchdog function would
seem especially apt.79 Modem realities, however, also impair the media's
role in providing insight and balance. Institutional interests in profit-
maximization, 4nd consequent incentive not to alienate viewers and
sponsors,80 -present powerful reasons not only to be but also to appear
objective even at the expense of incisiveness. Actual performance sug-
gests a dedication to evenhandedness to the point that objectivity is com-
tempt a cleanup but was denied necessary assistance by the Reagan Administration. Id. at 12-
13.
77. A prominent example is the Willie Horton advertisement by the Bush campaign
which pandered to racial anxieties and stereotypes.
78. The impact of some advertisements never may be undone. President Johnson's tele-
vised spot showed a girl counting petals on a flower which transmutes into a mushroom cloud.
The message implied a precipitate action by Barry Goldwater and proved disastrous to the
latter's fortunes.
79. The watchdog function of the press, as a check on political abuse and overreaching, is
discussed in Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, AM. B. FoUND. REs. J.
521, 527 (1977).
80. See Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94
187-89 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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promised and deception effectively is favored and rewarded.81 Further
deterring meaningful evaluation of political claims is the press' practical
aversion to antagonizing sources of information. 2 A truly objective
story that criticized an individual or entity thus might be softened to
avoid loss of future information. Compounded with other realities defin-
ing the modern marketplace of ideas, the net consequence is a diminished
capacity of normal counterpoints for false speech and further grounds for
dissatisfaction with conventional first amendment wisdom.
Just as speech is classified on the basis of perceived value, the press
is categorized according to concern with its impact. The analytical de-
parture point in determining the constitutional status of various media is
that "[e]ach method of communicating ideas is 'a law unto itself' [reflect-
ing the] 'differing natures, values, abuses and dangers' of each method."8"
Distress over the function and influence of the press predates actual juris-
prudence addressing a contemporary oligopolistic mass media industry.
Louis Brandeis, responding to technology preceding electronic moderni-
zation of the press, expressed concern with what he perceived as the me-
dia's intrusive potential and frivolous ways.84 Brandeis maintained that
the press was devoting increasingly too much attention to sensationalism
and gossip, neglecting "matters of genuine community concern" and
consequently inverting public priorities.85 His notion of a right to pri-
vacy was advanced as a means of accounting for altered circumstances
that, in part, the media both produced and influenced.
Brandeis' seminal concerns are enduring sources of justification for
delimiting freedom of the press. Formative jurisprudence this century
was quick to account for worries over the effect of newly emerging me-
dia. In Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Commission,86 he Court upheld
censorship of motion pictures.87 Consonant with impact considerations,
review focused upon the medium's "capability and power" for "evil,"
which was enhanced by its "attractiveness and manner of exhibition"88
and availibility to children. Depicting film as a medium that merely rep-
81. See Hinerfeld, supra note 74, at 20-21.
82. See id.
83. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 501 (1981) (billboard regulation)
(quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949)).
84. See Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. Rlv. 193, 195 (1890)
("[instantaneous photographs and newspaper enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of
private and domestic life").
85. Id.
86. 236 U.S. 230 (1915), overruled in Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
87. Id at 244-45.
88. Id. at 244.
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resented "events,... ideas and sentiments published and known," 9 the
Court denied motion pictures press status and effectively excluded them
from constitutional purview.90 Not until mid-century was the decision
overturned and film "included in the press whose freedom is guaranteed
by the First Amendment." '
By then even newer media had evolved, others were emerging, and
freedom of the press analysis was rooted in the premise that "each [me-
dium] tends to present its own peculiar problem." 92 Radio and television
in particular were subject to a comprehensive federal regulatory system
that required broadcasters to function as public trustees.93 Contrary to
traditional first amendment expectations, content regulation became nor-
mative to the extent considered necessary to facilitate fairness and bal-
ance, 94 to protect impressionable children from negative influence,95 and
to account for pervasive and intrusive ways. 96 Uniting those rationales at
least with respect to governance of broadcasting is the statutory obliga-
tion to serve the public interest.97 As history demonstrates, a public in-
terest standard "means about as little as any phrase that [can be
constructed]." 9 It introduces to freedom of the press analysis, more-
over, precisely the problem of valuation and subjectivity that plagues
freedom of speech jurisprudence. Fairness requirements have operated
unevenly99 and, as evidenced by persistent criticism and recent divest-
ment of the fairness doctrine itself, without persuasive justification."c°
Regulation of indecent expression purports to account for the interests of
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948). The Mutual
Film decision itself was overruled in Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
92. Joseph Burstyn, Inc., 343 U.S. at 503.
93. See Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-332, 390-510 (1988). The general
obligation of licensees to operate in the public interest is set by id. § 307(a).
94. The fairness doctrine, obligating broadcasters to raise controversial issues of public
importance and balance their coverage, was upheld in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367 (1969).
95. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978).
96. Id. at 748.
97. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
98. Caldwell, The Standard of Public Interest, Convenience or Necessity as Used in the
Radio 4ct of 1927, 1 AIR L. REv. 295, 296 (1930).
99. At the time the Court endorsed the fairness doctrine, daily newspapers were scarcer
than radio and television stations. See 1989 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 900, at 544, No. 913, at 549 (1,838 daily newspapers as opposed to 7,196 commercial radio
and television stations in 1970, one year after Red Lion Broadcasting). Nonetheless, the Court
rejected the proposed fairness obligation for publishers as an unconstitutional invasion of edi-
torial discretion. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
100. Scarcity is a universal feature of all media, rather than a unique characteristic of a
particular medium, given capital requirements for mass communicating. See Telecommunica-
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children and privacy' but simultaneously cuts against parental auton-
omy' 02 and concepts of privacy concerned with personal decision-mak-
ing.' °3 Despite debatable terms and conditions of control, regulation of
what has become the most dominant facet of the press is countenanced
because "of all forms of communication, it is broadcasting that ... re-
ceive[s] the most limited first amendment protection."'"
Modern first amendment theory, assessed against a backdrop of ex-
pression and media not contemplated two centuries ago, assumes too
much and too little. The notion that the First Amendment is inviolable
because it has served the nation so well exaggerates the quality of actual
performance. It also diverts attention from deficiencies in analytical
structure and consequences that disserve or underserve interests of cul-
tural pluralism associated with the First Amendment. Most importantly,
complacency retards recognition of intervening problems of a compelling
order, confounds understanding of actual first amendment dynamics, and
deters intellectual initiative that might facilitate a more profound
guarantee.
II. The First Amendment and Lost Opportunity
A. Historical Premises
The First Amendment, in an early stage of its jurisprudential devel-
opment, was characterized as "the matrix, the indispensable condition of
nearly every other form of freedom."'0 5 A sense that expressive freedom
was crucial to the vitality of other basic rights and liberties engendered
notions that the First Amendment's status within the constitutional or-
der was unique and judicial review should reflect its special role.' 0 6 The
Court itself invested in the premise, at least for a time, in declaring that
"[f]reedom of press, freedom of speech.., are in a preferred position."'
0 7
The concept, if fully and persistently subscribed to, would have profound
implications for a system of freedom of expression. Recognition that the
First Amendment is not merely an end in itself but a means of facilitating
tions Research and Action Center v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482
U.S. 919 (1987).
101. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978).
102. See id. at 770 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (some parents may wish to have their children
exposed to expressions offensive to others).
103. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (expounding concept of constitutional
privacy which incorporates personal decisions with respect to intimate matters).
104. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 748.
105. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).
106. See Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 608 (1942) (Stone, C.J., dissenting).
107. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943).
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the general liberty experience directs attention to values and emanations
pertinent to personal freedom generally. Rights of the public to access
the media for purposes of self-expression or for the press to obtain and
disseminate information may be rational extensions of the First Amend-
ment"'8 insofar as they help accommodate expressive freedom, individual
autonomy and democratic robustness. Modem jurisprudence generally
has repudiated the predicate of a preferred status, 10 9 however, and ac-
cordingly delimited analytical potential.
A particularly notable feature of first amendment law, as it has
evolved, is the multiple opportunities presented for effectuating constitu-
tional aims that have been bypassed. Enduring investment in the concept
of a preferred constitutional status, for instance, might not have steered
jurisprudence entirely away from the classification processes and balanc-
ing methodologies which now dominate modem review. Consistently
strong presumptions in the First Amendment's favor, however, likely
would alter the actual weight of competing interests. The outcome-de-
terminative potential of such calibration is evidenced most aptly by the
law of prior restraint. Because prior restraint is presumptively invalid
and imposes a heavy burden 10 of justification, constitutional survival of
such regulation is the exception. 1'
Despite missed opportunities for reinforcing the First Amendment's
general fabric, possibilities for adaptation still exist. Freedom of speech
and of the press were incorporated into the Bill of Rights when primary
identity and allegiance were to the state, not to the federal republic.' 12
Within that context the soapbox and street corner were common plat-
forms for speech, and pamphlets and leaflets were viable instrumentali-
ties for communicating to a larger audience." 3 Original concern that
expressive freedom might be compromised was directed exclusively to-
108. See infra notes 121-37 and accompanying text (public access) and notes 169-82 and
accompanying text (freedom of the press emanations).
109. Justice Frankfurter articulated the Court's discomfort with a premise suggesting "that
any law touching communication is infected with presumptive invalidity." Kovacs v. Cooper,
336 U.S. 77, 90 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
110. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam).
111. In one district court the presumption was overcome and the burden of justification
was satisfied when a magazine sought to publish an article on how to assemble a hydrogen
bomb. United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis.), appeal dismissed, 610
F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979). The court found that the risk to human life outweighed interests in
expressive freedom. Id. at 995. A subsequent appeal was dismissed after newspapers pub-
lished the same article. United States v. Progressive, Inc., 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979).
112. See D. FARBER & S. SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 300-01
(1990).
113. For a discussion of the early press and relative ease of entry into mass communication
then, see E. EMERY, THE PREss AND AMERICA 68 (1972).
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ward a national government generally perceived as the dominant threat
to personal liberty.1 14 The cumulative consequences of early federalist
policies, subsequent civil war, eventual constitutional amendments re-
vealing and responding to exercises of state power, 15 and later emer-
gence of a mass media industry, however, have ushered the First
Amendment into a radically different societal context. Expressive free-
dom may be imperiled not only by the federal government but by state
authority and private concentrations of power including the press itself.
Despite judicial accounting for state encroachment upon freedom of ex-
pression,' 16 the Court largely has declined invitations to manage doctrine
in ways that would reckon directly with the influence of private power. 
17
A few decades ago, it identified freedom of association as a constitutional
implication necessary to effectuate core first amendment freedom. 1 '
Nonetheless, the Court consistently has passed up opportunities to iden-
tify other emanations that would vitalize explicit guarantees of expressive
freedom." 19
B. Access to the Media
The emergence of mass media has prompted concern that individual
speaking opportunities have diminished inversely to institutional growth
and concentration. Such distress reflects the general sense that, for prac-
tical purposes, "[fjreedom of the press is guaranteed to those who own
one.' 20 Although presented with opportunities to heighten the signifi-
cance of individual speech, the Court largely has been resistant to the
methodology of direct enhancement. In Columbia Broadcasting System,
Inc. v. Democratic National Committee,121 the Court rejected the concept
of an unqualified right of public access that would have enabled individu-
als to purchase time on radio or television for self-expression purposes.122
114. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
115. The transition from a predominantly state to national identity was commenced by
jurisprudence developed during the first third of the Nineteenth Century. This movement
largely advanced Chief Justice Marshall's federalist vision of a strong central government and
national economy. See D. LIVELY, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE CONSENT OF THE Gov-
ERNED: AcrIVsT WAYS AND POPULAR ENDS 35-45 (1990). Adoption of the post-Civil War
amendments, particularly the Fourteenth Amendment, denoted the paramount significance of
national citizenship. See D. FARBER & S. SHERRY, supra note 112.
116. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
117. See infra notes 120-67 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 5.
119. See infra notes 168-81.
120. Liebling, THE NEW YORKER, May 14, 1960, reprinted in THE GREAT THOUGHTS
243 (G. Seldes ed. 1985).
121. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
122. Id. at 126-27.
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Faced with a choice between promoting free speech values or protecting
free press interests, the Court determined that public access was constitu-
tionally inconsonant and unwise as a matter of policy. The cardinal first
amendment problem was that the methodology would erode editorial
discretion-the traditional concern of the free press guarantee. 123 Even
if the constitutional difficulty were not so acute, the Court was bothered
by the practical consequences of allowing individuals to exercise editorial
power.
The Court expressed concern that access programming would be
slanted in favor of the wealthy or dominated by particular political
views. 124 By rejecting a lower court determination that individual speak-
ers "are the best judge of what the.., public ought to hear," 125 the Court
implicitly recognized a unique fumction of the press. Beyond defeating
free speech interests, however, a special role has yet to translate into spe-
cial constitutional status that might enhance the media's performance
and consequent significance of press freedom. 126
One year after largely foreclosing public access to broadcasting, the
Court in Miami Herald Publishing Company v. Tornillo 127 invalidated a
contingent right of access provision affording political candidates an op-
portunity to respond to a newspaper's editorial criticism. 128 The Court
observed that the newspaper industry had become less competitive, me-
dia ownership and control had become more concentrated, and power to
inform and shape public opinion now reposed "in a few hands." 129 It
further acknowledged that economic realities had made entry into the
modem publishing business "almost impossible" '13 and noted that reli-
ance upon competition for diversity and balance was no longer feasi-
ble.131  Despite recognizing the First Amendment's modem
circumstances, the Court depicted the qualified access provision as the
functional equivalent of a prior restraint. 132 The Court thus found the
measure constitutionally defective "because of its intrusion into the func-
tion of editors."133
123. Id.
124. Id. at 123.
125. Id. at 124.
126. See infra notes 168-75 and accompanying text.
127. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
128. Id. at 244, 254-55.
129. Id. at 250.
130. Id. at 251.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 258.
133. Id.
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The access decisions reveal that the Court largely was unmoved by
claims that the public has lost capacity to respond or to contribute in a
meaningful way to the debate on the issues.134 Justice Brennan would
have redirected analysis, at least in the broadcast context, to account for
intervening realities which he perceived as blunting the First Amend-
ment's original meaning.13 Brennan considered it "imperative that citi-
zens be permitted at least some opportunity to speak for themselves as
genuine advocates on issues that concern them."' 36 Without attention to
free speech values emphasizing input opportunity, he maintained that the
"profound national commitment to ... uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open" debate risked devolving into an inaccessible ideal.'
3 7
Concern that individual speech may be consigned to a fate akin to a
tree falling in the forest may have sounded a compelling note initially but
now may be coursing toward obsolescence. If the Court's aim is to repli-
cate the functional opportunity for speech as it existed two centuries ago,
it is arguable that technology that imperiled meaningful individual
speech now may facilitate it. Methodologies such as desktop publishing,
computer networks, two-way cable, fax machines and talk radio actually
may present avenues for effective self-expression that are more numerous
and effective than the Framers themselves contemplated.
1. The Fairness Doctrine
Despite rejecting direct access schemes that collide with editorial
freedom, the Court has not been entirely resistant to theories and
schemes for reconciling free speech and free press interests. To account
for societal change which has tested the First Amendment's utility, the
Court attempted to balance competing speech and press concerns to en-
hance diversity of information without unduly compromising editorial
autonomy. Broadcasting, emerging as the most dominant medium of the
century, 3 ' already had become subject to unique demands for fairness
and accountability that would have been constitutionally impermissible
134. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 195-96
(1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 187-89 (noting how transition to mass media society diminished opportunity for
and significance of individual speech).
136. Id. at 189-90 (emphasis in original).
137. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
138. Television and radio in 1988 reached respectively 98% and 99% of the nation's
homes. 1989 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, No. 900, at 544. In 1987, a
total of 9,911 commercial radio and television stations were in operation, id., compared to
1,646 daily newspapers. Id., No. 913, at 549.
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elsewhere.139 Consistent with the notion that each medium has unique
characteristics justifying special regulatory attention,"140 the fairness doc-
trine was formulated to promote diversity and balance.14 1 Not surpris-
ingly, this doctrine was challenged as an invasion of first amendment
rights. In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,142 the Court endorsed the
fairness principle. Noting that the demand for broadcast frequencies ex-
ceeded the supply,143 and that some views and ideas might be denied
access to the information marketplace," the Court constructed a first
amendment public right "to receive suitable access to social, political,
esthetic, moral and other ideas and experiences." 145 By upholding the
fairness doctrine, the Court thus elevated constitutionally glossed view-
ing and listening rights above traditional notions of freedom of the
press. 146 As noted previously,147 the Court ultimately refused to expand
viewpoint access into a personal access regime that would have defined
the public's right in terms of input as well as output.
The resultant accommodation, occupying a middle ground between
access and absolute editorial autonomy, proved constitutionally and
practically troublesome to the point that it represented the worst of both
worlds. In practice, the fairness doctrine 48 deterred rather than facili-
tated robust and unfettered debate. Regulatory assumptions failed to ac-
count for the industrial reality that broadcasting's profitability is
dependent upon market share, and strategies for maximizing audiences
favor programming toward mainstream tastes and away from issues or
ideas that would be unsettling or antagonistic thereto. 149 Barring asser-
139. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) ("[i]t has yet
to be demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial process can be [reconciled]
with the First Amendment").
140. See supra notes 83 and 92 and accompanying text.
141. The fairness doctrine essentially obligated broadcasters to devote a reasonable amount
of time to controversial issues of public importance and, in so doing, afford opportunity for
contrasting views. See In re The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and
the Public Interest Standards of the Communication Act, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 7 (1974) (hereinafter
Fairness Report).
142. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
143. Id. at 388 ("substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there are fre-
quencies to allocate").
144. Id at 389.
145. Id. at 390.
146. The Court determined that "the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the
broadcasters,.., is paramount." Id
147. See supra notes 121-36.
148. See Syracuse Peace Council v. Television Station WTVH Syracuse, 2 F.C.C. Red.
5043, 5052 (1987), aff'd, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
149. See Fowler & Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast Regulation, 60 TEx. L.
R v. 207, 229 (1982); Bazelon, FCC Regulation of the Telecommunications Press, 1975 DUKE
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tive enforcement, the fairness dotrine under such circumstances at most
could facilitate orthodox or safe controversy.15 1 Concern that unpopular
sentiments might alienate viewers, listeners, and sponsors represented a
significant deterrent to meaningful diversity."' Compounding the disin-
centive to "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate1 52 was recogni-
tion that a fairness complaint eventuated administrative, reputational,
and legal costs.
153
The fairness doctrine was problematic not only with respect to its
own regulatory aims but also with respect to first amendment concerns.
By requiring coverage of, and balanced attention to, controversial issues,
the FCC reserved significant content-based control over the dominant
mass medium. Fairness enforcement afforded latitude to broadcasters in-
sofar as the FCC generally assumed good faith licensee judgment and
discretion.1 54 Broadcasters also were significantly indulged "in selecting
the manner of coverage, the appropriate spokesmen, and the technique of
production and presentation.'
' 55
To the extent meaningfully enforced, the fairness doctrine was a reg-
ulatory charade. Insofar as it might be activated, however, the regula-
tion was constitutionally perilous. The fairness doctrine in principle
assigned content responsibility to official authority rather than editorial
autonomy. 56 The FCC's power already had been recognized as exceed-
ing the authority to govern the engineering and technical aspects of
broadcasting.1 57 Jurisprudential investment in the scarcity rationale ena-
bled the FCC to concern itself with "program format and the kinds of
programs broadcast by licensees." '158 Even if not regularly exercised,
L.J. 213, 231-32. Justice Brennan has noted that broadcasters assume "angry customers are
not good customers, and ... it is simply 'bad business' to espouse-or even to allow others to
espouse-the heterodox or the controversial." Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Demo-
cratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 187 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
150. See Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C. Rd. at 5049.
151. See supra note 149.
152. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1974).
153. See Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C. Red. at 5050.
154. See Fairness Report, supra note 141, at 8, 23.
155. Fairness Report, supra note 141, at 16. Of 4,280 fairness complaints received in 1973
and 1974, for instance, the FCC made findings against licensees in only 19 instances. In re
Public Issues Under the Fairness Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards of the Communi-
cations Act, 58 F.C.C.2d 691, 709 (1976) (Robinson, Comm'r, dissenting) (hereinafter Recon-
sideration of Fairness Report).
156. Reconsideration of Fairness Report, supra note 155, at 707-08 (Robinson, Comm'r,
dissenting).
157. See National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 215 (1943).
158. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 395 (1969).
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broad and intrusive enforcement powers1 59 were judicially countenanced
if licensees proved unresponsive to fairness imperatives. 1" Given a
broadcaster's interest in retaining a license to remain in business, the
mere existence of powerful enforcement devices imperiled editorial au-
tonomy and independence. 61  The fairness doctrine invited interference
with, and abuse of, the editorial process as a function of political conven-
ience and expediency.1 62 Although fairness could not be effectuated un-
less regulation was forceful, such methodology itself was inimical to basic
precepts of editorial freedom.
Investment in the scarcity premise reflected the sense that a subtrac-
tion of first amendment liberty was essential for advancing first amend-
ment interests. 163 Eventually, the Supreme Court invited the FCC to
reexamine the foundation of and the need for the fairness doctrine.164
Adverting to many of the criticisms that its policy had engendered, 161 the
FCC concluded that scarcity was no longer an apt regulatory predi-
cate. 166 It further determined that constitutional interests would be bet-
ter accounted for by applying "full First Amendment protections against
content regulation... equally to the electronic and the printed press."
167
Pending reintroduction of fairness or any comparable duty, the contours
159. Violation of the Communications Act of 1934 or rules promulgated thereunder may
result in revocation of a broadcasting license, short-term renewal, nonrenewal, or fine. See
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 307(d), 312(b) (1982).
160. See Red Lion Broadcasting, 395 U.S. at 395.
161, Broadcasters thus were especially vulnerable to "regulation by the lifted eyebrow."
Robinson, The FCC and the First Amendment: Observation on 40 Years of Radio and Televi-
sion Regulation, 52 MINN. L. Rv. 67, 119 (1967) (quoting Miami Broadcasting Co.
(WQAM), 14 R.R. 125, 128 (1956) (Doerfer, Comm'r, dissenting)). An informal inquiry or
expression of official concern may have a profound chilling efflect on the creativity and flexibil-
ity of an industry dependent upon official authorization of existence. See ia at 119-20.
162. See S. SIMMONS, THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE AND THE MEDIA 219-20 (1978) (discuss-
ing manner in which fairness regulation invited misuse by several presidential administra-
tions). See also In re Inquiry into § 3.1910 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations
Concerning the General Fairness Doctrine Obligations of Broadcast Licensees, 102 F.C.C.2d
145, 192-94 (1985) (hereinafter Fairness Inquiry).
163. The Supreme Court openly acknowledged its construction of an "unusual order of
First Amendment values." Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm.,
412 U.S. 94, 101 (1973).
164. When cable was still in a relatively formative stage, the Supreme Court noted that it
would "afford increased opportunities for the discussion of public issues." Id. at 131. A dec-
ade later, the Court intimated its readiness to discard the scarcity rationale if it received a
"signal from Congress or the FCC that technological developments have advanced so far that
some revision of the system of broadcast regulation may be required." FCC v. League of
Women Voters of California, 468 U.S. 364, 377 n.ll (1984).
165. See Syracuse Peace Council v. Television Station WTVH Syracuse, 2 F.C.C. Rcd.
5043, 5049-58 (1987), aff'd, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
166. See id. at 5054-55.
167. Id. at 5057.
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of public discourse in theory as well as in actuality, and within perime-
ters of protected speech, remain a function of the mass media's editorial
judgment.
2. Effect on Freedom of the Press
Dependence upon the mass media for basic information pertinent to
self-governance and personal development raises society's stake in an en-
ergetic and effective press. As the republic has grown, citizens have be-
come increasingly remote from centers of official policy and decision.
First amendment jurisprudence generally has been reluctant to invest in
concepts that would enhance the media's utility, even when functioning
as the citizenry's agent and trading in "ideas essential to intelligent self-
government." '168 In a variety of contexts, the Court has refused to find
implicit in freedom of the press the right to gather news.169 Despite ar-
guments that freedom to publish has little meaning without the ability to
protect sources1 70 or to access information,1 71 the Court has afforded
both the press and the public identical measures of constitutional privi-
lege.172 As the media's role as a proxy has expanded, therefore, the
press' capacity to perform its representative function has been con-
founded by an absence of doctrinal support.
At least for constitutional purposes, the Court has resisted implica-
tions of a special media function. Accordingly, the press is not immune
to the workings and demands of the criminal justice system, regardless of
the consequent impact upon the flow of information. In Zurcher v. Stan-
ford Daily,173 the Court upheld the use of a search warrant to obtain
evidence from a newsroom even though the newspaper was not suspected
of any crime.174 It thus rejected the notion that first amendment interests
require use of a less intrusive subpoena duces tecum.1 75 Concerns over
chilling sources and impairing the flow of information also were dis-
missed when, in Branzburg v. Hayes,176 the Court refused to acknowl-
168. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 863 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting).
169. See infra notes 172-80 and accompanying text.
170. See infra notes 176-80 and accompanying text.
171. See infra notes 173-77.
172. E.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 674 (1972) (criminal justice system entitled to
receive "everyman's evidence").
173. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
174. Id. at 556-68.
175. Id. at 559-62. Congress responded to the Zurcher decision by enacting the Privacy
Protection Act of 1980, which limits the circumstances in which police may search a news-
room. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000aa, 2000aa-7 (1988).
176. 408 U.S. 665.
edge a first amendment privilege from testifying before a grand jury.177
The Court thereby affirmed the premise that the press is not entitled to
special privilege or attention incident to the First Amendment.178
Arguments that the press should have access rights to information
unavailable to the general public likewise have been impaled by princi-
ples denying special status. Contrary sentiment maintains that, given the
media's evolution into a surrogate role, a right to obtain information is a
logical emanation of the right to communicate. Consistent with that no-
tion, Justice Powell observed that an
informed public depends on accurate and effective reporting by the
news media. No individual can obtain for himself the information
needed for the intelligent discharge of his political responsibilities.
For most citizens the prospect of personal familiarity with news-
worthy events is hopelessly unrealistic. In seeking out the news the
press therefore acts as an agent of the public at large. It is the
means by which the people receive that free flow of information
and ideas essential to intelligent self-government. By enabling the
public to assert meaningful control over the political process, the
press performs a crucial function in effecting the societal purpose
of the First Amendment.... The underlying right is the right of
the public generally. The press is the necessary representative of
the public's interest in this context and the instrumentality which
effects the public's right.179
Justice Powell effectively stated the case for jurisprudential identifi-
cation of first amendment emanations essential to vitalizing the First
Amendment's core guarantees. Still, the Court has refused to define ac-
cess in terms of doctrine that would respond to modem circumstances
and facilitate a more functional information marketplace. Access for
both the public and the press is determined pursuant to the same stan-
dard: whether a venue is traditionally open. 8 Such review not only
repudiates any meaningful distinction between the press and the public
but also risks holding future review captive to custom rather than evolv-
ing imperative.81 The analysis also is susceptible to criticism for blind-
ing itself to contemporary realities as they impinge upon basic aims of an
177. Id. at 688.
178. Id. at 690-91 ("reporters, like other citizens," must respond to the needs of grand
jury).
179. Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 863-64 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(criticizing decision upholding ban on press interviews with prison inmates).
180. See Globe Newspaper Company v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 605 (1982) (criminal
trial traditionally open to public).
181. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 577-78 (1980) (plurality
opinion) (right of access "to places traditionally open to the public.., assured by the amalgam
of the First Amendment guarantees of speech and press"); Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S.
1, 15-16 (1978) (plurality opinion) (right of access extends coextensively to press and public).
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informed and enlightened public.
182
From accumulated jurisprudence emerges a First Amendment that
is criticized simultaneously for being too expansive and too constrained.
Freedom of the press in one instance is broadly defined to the point of
engendering distress that freedom of speech interests are suffocated. The
First Amendment is a reference point too for schemes that erode both
free press interests and free speech values. When the media's own poten-
tial for effective agency is implicated, freedom of the press has been
pinched to the point that its functional capabilities are undermined. The
result is a First Amendment mired in uncertain values, unsynchronized
in significant part to contemporary circumstances and il-equipped to
confront the future.
I. Rehabilitating the First Amendment
A commonly identified virtue of the Constitution is its capacity to
speak comprehensively while actually saying relatively little. 83 The ad-
vantage of documental compactness and efficiency is exaggerated, how-
ever, insofar as constitutional law becomes increasingly convoluted. To
the extent basic law becomes detached from contemporary imperatives,
constitutional interpretation also risks disengagement from moral stan-
dards and prevailing values that afford credibility and legitimacy. The
law of expressive liberty, as it courses into a third century, risks devolv-
ing into a condition inviting cynicism rather than esteem. Freedom of
speech already is knotted and cramped by classification and
micromanagement systems that subtract from the maximum possible
sum of expressive freedom. For the press, the ambit of constitutional
security effectively has narrowed even while the media universe has ex-
panded. Because first amendment standards are now calibrated to afford
maximum protection to traditional media with diminishing influence and
demand enhanced scrutiny for newer media that are dominant,1 84 the
basic guarantee is more circumseript now than ever before. The general
notion of freedom of the press is further discounted when the press' per-
formance as a proxy of the citizenry is most implicated.18 5 Warnings not
to tamper with the First Amendment thus are hard to take seriously
when the guarantee appears so substantially compromised. To make
182. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
183. Textual economy results in majestic principles that nonetheless must be amplified and
particularized. See L. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT 48 (1985).
184. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (broadcasting is the least pro-
tected of all media).
185. See supra notes 168-82 and accompanying text (freedom of press delineated narrowly
so as to deny arguable emanations).
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contemporary sense out of the First Amendment, it is impossible to turn
the clock back to 1791 or to the earlier part of this century to the origins
of expressive freedom jurisprudence.186 Reality is that not only the me-
dia but also society has experienced profound changes in circumstances
which demand constitutional attention.
Freedom of expression was enshrined in a decentralized, political
and economic setting rather than in the organized and developed indus-
trial and commercial framework that subsequently emerged. Earlier ex-
ercises of speech and press freedom are notable for their lack of
commercialism.1 87 Commercial speech not only would become the foun-
dation upon which modern mass media were erected188 but also a signifi-
cant and valued form of expression in its own right.18 9 Since 1791,
society also has moved in the direction of cultural pluralism attributable
both to immigration patterns and to social factors that have reinforced
group identity."19 Even within subgroups, diversity manifests itself in va-
rying degrees of expressive taste and tolerance. Pertinent standards
meanwhile have become fixed as a function of dominant preference and a
perspective that fails to look forward and inadequately comprehends the
present.1 91 Freedom of speech theory fastened on the overarching im-
portance of political expression thus is bound in a romanticized but non-
existent state. Such premises are susceptible to criticism for disregarding
a dysfunctional marketplace of ideas' 92 and failing to construct principles
186. Cf. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954) (modem equal protection
cannot be defined by "turn[ing] the clock back to 1868 when the [Fourteenth] Amendment
was adopted, or even to 1896 when" segregation was upheld).
187. Early publishing emphasized persuasion rather than profit, as many organs of opinion
were the information arms of political parties. See F. HUDSON, JOURNALISM IN THE UNITED
STATES FROM 1690 TO 1782 141-42 (1969).
188. Advertising provides the primary revenue base for newspapers, which sell space, and
radio and television, which sell time. Consequent influence of sponsors over program content
and diversity interests has evoked distress from critics of jurisprudential response so far. See
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'1 Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 187-89 (1973)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
189. Commercial speech attained constitutional status pursuant to the sense that interest in
it was "as keen, if not keener" than in political expression. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 763 (1976).
190. Racial distinctions until the middle of this century, for instance, were a matter of
official ordination reflecting the dominant culture's customs, traditions and preferences. See
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550 (1896).
191. Justice Brennan has criticized the Court's intolerance of purportedly indecent or of-
fensive expression as reflecting an "acute enthnocentric myopia" and "depressing inability to
appreciate that in our land of cultural pluralism, there are many who think, act, and talk
differently from the Members of the Court, and who do not share their fragile sensibilities."
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 775 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
192. See supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text.
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that account effectively for even that narrow range of speech interests.
193
Freedom of press analysis is subject to claims it protects and binds the
media in the wrong ways at the wrong times.
194
Renovating the First Amendment so that it serves the expressive
interests of contemporary society can be accomplished either by rewrit-
ing or by reinterpreting the First Amendment. Given the general resist-
ance to overt tampering with documental structure, jurisprudential
revision is likely to be the more practical alternative. To proceed in that
direction, however, it is necessary to identify a general analytical depar-
ture point that is principled and thus conducive to credible results. Inso-
far as the First Amendment is not an absolute, expoundment of
expressive freedom becomes a process analogous to fathoming the mean-
ing of liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment.1 9 Modem fundamen-
tal rights'9 6 have emerged not from constitutional explication but
pursuant to inquiries into what is "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty"'197 or "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."' 198
As guides for charting the contours of the First Amendment, such refer-
ence points afford a respectable basis for reexamining some stale assump-
tions, updating the visage of pertinent jurisprudence, and accounting
more effectively for modem realities that impair expressive pluralism. A
candid and objective inquiry into the implications of ordered liberty and
the content of the nation's conscience affords a first step in fashioning
doctrine congruent with societal moral development and expectations.
In assessing the various speech classifications recognized by the
Court, it is immediately evident that the status of political expression
would not change significantly pursuant to a new analytical regime.
Even if the political process is not characterized by comprehensive citi-
193. Foreclosing logical radiations of freedom of the press, such as the right to acquire
information or protect sources, confounds effectuation of informed self-government. See supra
notes 168-82 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 168-82 and accompanying text.
195. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 ("No state shall... deprive any person of... liberty...
without due process of law").
196. Jurisprudence has glossed upon the fourteenth amendment rights which, although not
documentally enumerated, are accorded constitutional status. E.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U.S. 374 (1978) (marital rights); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (plural-
ity opinion) (familial liberty); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (liberty to elect abortion).
Fundamental rights also have been constructed upon nonspecific constitutional footing. E.g.,
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elec-
tions, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (right to vote).
197. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
198. Id. at 192 (quoting Moore, 431 U.S. at 503).
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zen participation, 199 governance nonetheless remains a function of electo-
ral choice and representative decision-making. Expression relating to
informed self-government, even if acted upon by only half of the popula-
tion,"'o is impossible to detach from the implication of ordered liberty.
Given the value placed upon such expression in shaping the republic, and
the tolerance of falsehood and vilification of a political nature that exists
today,2"' a relatively unbridled freedom of speech pertaining to self-gov-
ernment is well-rooted in societal tradition. Even assuming an increas-
ingly dysfunctional information marketplace,2°2reforms that require
official accountability may be a more treacherous alternative. Although
methodologies of manipulation and distortion have become more sophis-
ticated, it is doubtful that the nation's traditions or conscience would
support departure from the First Amendment's original assumption of
risk that the public would be misinformed or apathetic.20 3
It is also likely that modem renderings with respect to defamation
and privacy fairly approximate what the law should be. Even acknow-
ledging Justice White's concern that false speech pollutes the stream of
information,' 4 deception and misrepresentation are well-established cus-
toms.20 5 Because injury to reputation and violation of privacy are viewed
less hospitably by society, to the extent government officials and famous
or influential persons are not implicated, standards that narrowly define
public figures in terms of prominence or power and that are more sensi-
tive to ordinary persons20 6 fairly reflect tradition and conscience.
Commercial expression for modem purposes, as previously noted,
may be more pertinent to the general citizenry than any other variant of
199. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
200. See a
201. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271 (1964) (constitutional protec-
tion of expression does not depend on truth, popularity, or social utility of ideas or belief).
202. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
203. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791-92 (1978).
204. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
205. Modem political campaigning is conducted pursuant to well-established strategies for
both manipulating and distorting the truth. See supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
President Johnson in 1964, for instance, gave his pledge not to send American troops "to do
what Asian boys ought to be doing for themselves." S. KARNOW, VIETNAM, A HSTORY 395
(1983). While making such promises for public consumption, Johnson was informing the mili-
tary of his intent to escalate troop levels after the election. Id. at 326. The episode fits a
consistent pattern that accounts for broken promises by other politicians such as: Lincoln not
to tamper with slavery, Franklin Roosevelt not to enter into war and Bush not to raise taxes.
206. "Public figures," for purposes of activating the actual malice standard in a defamation
action, are restricted to persons with widespread fame or who inject themselves into a particu-
lar public controversy for purposes of influencing the outcome. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323, 351 (1979); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1976).
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speech.2 ' 7 Assessment of the proper constitutional status for commercial
speech is complicated by the varying results that depend upon the stan-
dard of measurement used by the Court. Examined from the perspective
of tradition and conscience, commercial expression discloses a history of
assumption that such speech was unprotected and therefore regulable.2 °8
Given the centrality of commercial considerations to the nation's forma-
tion, however, it is arguable that unfettered expression concerning eco-
nomic transactions or self-interest is a logical condition of ordered
liberty.
Resolution of the apparent conflict requires a deeper understanding
of why expression is subject to regulation even within the existing frame-
work of governance. Despite the Court's intimation that the possibility
of content control is a function of speech value, the significance of the
regulatory interest may be more determinative. Even political speech
may be prohibited if the danger it presents is considered too profound.20 9
Tolerance of political falsehood may reflect less the expression's signifi-
cance than public perceptions, evidenced by electoral participation, that
politics are less important than commerce. Deception in commercial
transactions generally has a more palpable and personalized impact, con-
trasted with political lies that tend to be diffused rather than particular-
ized.210 Given the relative differences of participation in the economic
and political marketplaces, commercial misrepresentations directly affect
more persons. They have the potential, depending on context, to endan-
ger life or health211 or to undermine societal confidence necessary for
economic vitality.
212
207. See supra notes 67 and 189 and accompanying text.
208. Until 1976, commercial speech was excluded from the First Amendment's purview
pursuant to Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (First Amendment no barrier to
regulation of commercial speech). '
209. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (speech can be regu-
lated upon showing of direct, imminent and likely harm against which government has power
to protect). Even the presumptive invalidity of prior restraint has been surmounted when
strong reasons are identified. See United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D.
Wis.), appeal dismissed, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979) (publication of article on how to make
hydrogen bomb enjoined when danger to first amendment interests outweighed by danger to
life and national security).
210. A political lie almost invariably exists for mass consumption and may be irrelevant to
a voter's actual choice. Injury, moreover, stems from the combined voting preferences of a
majority. A deceptive sales pitch that fails to satisfy what was promised, however, has defin-
able adverse consequences manifestly attributable to the falsehood.
211. The promotion of products which endanger health typifies such advertising.
212. False and misleading representation in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of
securities typifies such expression. Maintenance of investor confidence is at the center of com-
prehensive regulation of the field. See SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953);
Preamble to Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, tit. I, § 1, 48 Stat. 74 (1933).
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The reality that commercial expression possesses more value and
utility for society than political speech reveals a significant truth about
the First Amendment. Constitutionality of content regulation actually
seems to be determined by how dangerous and potentially disruptive ex-
pressive freedom would be to a profound societal interest, not by the
importance of the speech. Given a society shaped by the need for a via-
ble economic union, and centrally concerned with material progress indi-
vidually and collectively, first amendment traditions must compete with
even longer standing concern with economic integrity, opportunity, and
vitality.
Assessing the proper constitutional status of sexually explicit expres-
sion is a thorny exercise regardless of the employed standards. Inquiries
into the implications of ordered liberty or into the content of tradition
and conscience almost invariably produce disputed and inconclusive re-
sults. The evaluative process breaks down because efforts to define uni-
versal principles are impossible when no consensus exists. The central
lesson of obscenity and indecency review is that these concepts are elu-
sive and the first amendment problem is intractable. Because premises
for content control remain largely speculative,213 but significant regula-
tory support exists nonetheless, a practicable resolution requires a com-
promise between cultural inclinations to foreclose such expression and
the interest in constitutional damage control.
The most sensible accommodation would be to eliminate any official
proscription of sexually explicit expression except to the extent necessary
to protect unconsenting adults and children.214 The interests of adults
wishing to avoid exposure to such expression largely can be effectuated
by regulation that goes no further than requiring warnings and advance
disclosure. Although the problem may be more complicated with respect
to children, protection may be afforded with minimum damage to expres-
sive interests by imposing significant penalties for distribution to minors
and reliance upon inexpensive technology for customized restriction of
access to the electronic media.21 5
Given a definitional problem akin to that which confounds obscenity
213. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63 (1973) (prohibition of obscenity
permissible pursuant to "unprovable assumptions").
214. See id. at 112-13 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (urging redaction of prevailing obscenity
doctrine).
215. Channel blockers and similar technological devices are an available and inexpensive
alternative to taxing expressive pluralism. See Sable Communications of California, Inc. v.
FCC, 109 S. Ct. 2829, 2837 (1989); Lively, supra note 18, at 974 n.104.
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law,2 16 fighting words should be eliminated altogether as a discrete cate-
gory of expression. Liquidation of the classification would not pretermit
actionability on the alternative grounds that speech was defamatory or
injurious to a point warranting official intervention.217 Elimination of
the category would reduce constitutional clutter and steer review toward
a common point of assessment that, regardless of how speech might be
classified, merely inquires whether a compelling reason existed for its
regulation.
The simplified analysis would displace the classification process,
which consistently subtracts from the sphere of expressive freedom, and
minimize investment in disputable values. Consequent review would
function as a general balancing process that, instead of making procrus-
tean assessments of speech value, would focus primarily upon the profun-
dity of regulatory interests. Balancing in the context of the First
Amendment is not an analytical methodology immune to criticism.218
So long as freedom of speech and of the press are not regarded as abso-
lutes, balancing is a necessary consequence. The treachery of the existing
analytical regime's operation is compounded by a valuation process that
diminishes the significance of some speech and excludes other variants
entirely from constitutional purview. Review analogous to strict scrutiny
of racial classifications in the equal protection context would regard con-
tent control as the first amendment equivalent of a suspect classifica-
tion.21 9  As evidenced by fourteenth amendment jurisprudence,
220
insistence on a compelling state interest safeguards trenchant constitu-
tional concerns against compromise absent exigent circumstances.221
216. Classification of speech as fighting words, like obscenity, is "susceptible of application
to protected expression." Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 523 (1972).
217. As even the most ardent of absolutists has conceded, the First Amendment is less of a
barrier to official intervention "when speech is brigaded with conduct." See, e.g., Brandenburg
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 456-57 (1969) (Douglas and Black, JJ., concurring).
218. See, eg., Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 60-61 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting)
(Framers performed all balancing required and permitted by First Amendment).
219. The term "suspect classification" is lifted from the lexicon of equal protection and
affords the basis for strict judicial scrutiny. See, eg., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
488 U.S. 469, 500-01 (1989).
220. Strict scrutiny of racial classifications, at least before the issue of affirmative action,
was described as "'strict' in theory and fatal in fact." Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolv-
ing Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV.
1, 8 (1972).
221. Outside the affirmative action context, and since Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
383 (1954), the closest the Court has come to supporting a racial classification is plurality
endorsement of segregating prisoners in emergency circumstances. See Lee v. Washington,
390 U.S. 333 (1968) (Black, Harlan and Stewart, JJ., concurring).
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Suspectness and close scrutiny do not foreclose regulation,2 22 but control
is considered in a particularized fashion and allowed only when ex-
plained in exceptionally persuasive terms.
Full accounting for expressive freedom under modem circumstances
requires attention to the charge that speaking opportunities have been
lost or significantly diminished as a consequence of transition into a mass
media society. Enhancement of individual speech interests, pursuant to
access or any comparable remedial formula, invariably conflicts with
freedom of the press. Because it is no more an absolute than any other
constitutional guarantee, freedom of the press is susceptible to review
when a compelling justification exists. In the abstract, effectuation of
first amendment aims and values may intimate a trenchant premise. The
peril inherent in ordering expressive interests perceived to be in conflict is
that one freedom may be bruised in advancing another, and the object of
rescue may be transferred merely from private to official captivity.
History has demonstrated that fairness concepts create significant
constitutional risks and few practical rewards.223 Access notions may be
relatively less threatening to editorial freedom insofar as input opportu-
nity, rather than output management, is emphasized. Instead of requir-
ing qualitative evaluation of whether coverage is comprehensive and
balanced,224 government oversight would be limited to whether the mini-
mum required space or time was set aside for the public. By recognizing
the right of viewers and listeners as paramount,225 the Court already has
completed much of the doctrinal travel necessary to account for the
problems of a mass media society. In rejecting the case for public access
nearly two decades ago, the Court observed that "[c]onceivably at some
future date Congress or the [Federal Communications] Commission-or
the broadcasters-may devise some kind of limited right of access that is
both practicable and desirable. ' 226 Public access is already a legislated
feature of cable.227 Justification for official intervention on behalf of first
222. Racial classification of a remedial nature is permissible, for instance, to redress prova-
ble instances of past discrimination. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 504.
223. See supra notes 148-62 and accompanying text.
224. Fairness regulation was problematic in large part because it required precisely such
content oversight. See supra notes 159-62 and accompanying text.
225. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1987). The paramount right
of viewers and listeners has not been cast aside with the fairness doctrine. See Syracuse Peace
Council v. Television Station WTVH Syracuse, 2 F.C.C. Red. 5043, 5055-57 (1987) (deregu-
lated information marketplace better serves public's paramount right), aff'd, 867 F.2d 654
(D.C. Cir. 1989).
226. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 131
(1973).
227. See Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-605 (1984).
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amendment values, however, may be even less compelling as time passes.
As long as alternatives exist for effectuating a profound interest in a way
less burdensome to a fundamental freedom, the less restrictive option
must be chosen.228 As noted previously, modem technology is affording
new opportunities for speech that may equal or surpass participation
contemplated when the First Amendment was crafted.229 Official inter-
vention now, therefore, may be both belated and premature.
Attention to the facilitation of first amendment values would be bet-
ter directed toward facilitating the media's role as the citizenry's proxy.
Given society's general evolution, the average citizen not only has limited
influence upon public debate but also is increasingly remote from actual
sources of policy and decision. First amendment functions and interests,
whether defined in terms of an informed citizenry, checking official
power, or individual development, depend heavily upon institutional pro-
curing and processing of information. It is myopic to determine that the
press and public have coextensive rights to access official facilities and
information when individuals generally have neither the time, resources,
nor knowledge to investigate the multifold venues and archives of mod-
em governance. The touchstone for identifying a constitutional emana-
tion is whether the interest at issue is essential for effectuating the core
guarantee.23 Viewed from that perspective, meaningful freedom of the
press is not merely a function of liberty to publish but a guarantee that
extends to acquisition of data and protection of sources. Federal law
concerning open records231 and meetings232 statutorily accounts for news
gathering interests and may be qualified only by specific exemption.233
While affording protection for material subject to traditional privilege
claims,234 the enactments do not provide the media with confidentiality
for information sources. The law of privilege reflects a general sense,
however, that countervailing policy reasons merit departure from normal
228. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 380 (1984).
229. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
230. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958).
231. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1967), amended by 5 U.S.C. § 552
(Supp. V 1987).
232. Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1976).
233. The Freedom of Information Act contains exemptions from a statutory duty to dis-
close in specified instances pertaining to national security, internal personnel practices and
rules, exemption by congressional enactment, trade secrets, matters that would be nondis-
coverable within the legal system, medical files, investigative records, bank examiner reports,
and geological and geophysical data. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(I)-(9).
234. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5).
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demands of process.235 If immunity can be justified pursuant to tradi-
tional assumptions of common or statutory law, the case for variance is
even more powerful when constitutional interests are present.
Constitutional revitalization is an essential exercise if the First
Amendment is to account satisfactorily for realities that have intervened
to complicate expressive freedom over the past two centuries. Such an
event initially requires expanding the frontiers of discourse concerning
the reference points by which constitutional principle is charted. Ex-
isting boundaries of debate, comprehending disputes over the general
value of free expression, appraisal of specific speech variants, and assess-
ments of various media, largely fail to accommodate concerns that are
even more paramount to the First Amendment's utility. Theory and
principle that speak more to the past than to the future are logical exten-
sions of the conviction that the First Amendment is untouchable and its
revision unthinkable. A sense that debate should be limited or avoided
creates a profound incongruity when the topic is the guarantee of free
trade in ideas. Notions that the First Amendment should be insulated
from the very risks it assumes represent grounds for concern, not consti-
tutional complacency.
IV. Conclusion
The concept of a living constitution implies significant responsibility
for ensuring that its guarantees, which are neither self-defining nor self-
executing, do not become anachronistic or dysfunctional. Notions that
the First Amendment is beyond restructuring or serious reconsideration
are inimical to that obligation. Such sentiment wrongly assumes that the
guarantee has functioned at a consistent level of excellence and continues
to do so. Reflecting upon and retooling the First Amendment, juris-
prudentially or otherwise, are exercises consonant with, rather than sub-
versive of, constitutional governance. Monitoring and if necessary
recontouring basic first amendment law are essential for a society that,
although historically connected to circumstances which engendered the
First Amendment, is defined by further personality, values and needs.
Jurisprudence that acknowledges and at least attempts to account for
evolving realities ultimately redeems rather than rebukes the meaning
and significance of the Constitution itself.
235. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(privileges allowable to extent they promote "a public good transcending the" needs and ends
of legal process).
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